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Abstract
In this article, I use Stengers’ (2010) concepts of ‘factish’, ‘requirements’ and ‘obligations’,
as well as Latour’s (1993) critique of modernity, to interrogate the rise of Equal Tem-
perament as the dominant system of tuning for western music. I argue that Equal
Temperament is founded on an unacknowledged compromise which undermines its
claims to rationality and universality. This compromise rests on the standardization
which is the hallmark of the tuning system of Equal Temperament, and, in this way, it is
emblematic of Latour’s definition of modernity. I further argue that the problem of the
tuning of musical instruments is one which epitomizes the modern distinction between
the natural and the social. In turn, this bears witness to what Whitehead calls the
‘Bifurcation of Nature’. Throughout this article, using the work of Stengers and Latour, I
seek to use tuning as a case study which allows social research to talk both of the natural
and of the social aspects of music and tuning, without recourse to essentialism or simple
social construction. In this way, my argument seeks to avoid bifurcating nature.
Keywords
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Introduction
In this article, I aim to utilize some of the arguments set out in Stengers’ (2010) text Cos-
mopolitics, vol. I, in order to investigate the problem of the tuning of musical instruments
in the West and one, dominant, solution to this question, namely ‘Equal Temperament’,
which developed from the late 17th century. Put simply, Equal Temperament refers to the
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system of tuning where the ‘distance’ between each note is equal. This is, perhaps, best
envisaged in terms of the modern piano keyboard where each note is one equal step up
from the previous one. Today, this model has become so ubiquitous that it is sometimes
difficult to see it in its specificity, and as only one possible solution. Indeed, many people
are surprised to learn that there could be other ways of tuning, rather than assigning a
specific frequency to each note, with an equal gap between all notes. Other paths, other
courses could have been taken. There is a historical specificity to Equal Temperament
but this does not reduce it to a mere social phenomenon, or so I will argue. Rather, the
notion of history invoked here is more redolent of, though not synonymous with, the
approach of the early Foucault (for example, 1967, 1974) in that the historical refers
to the contingency of the manner in which thoughts, words, actions, different knowl-
edges and, importantly, things, all coalesced to produce a state of affairs which is nowa-
days taken for granted but which could have been otherwise.
Before turning to my argument, I should point out that the history and theory of tuning
is a vast and complex area with an abounding literature. The problem of tuning is one
which has been discussed for over 2,000 years and it is not possible to do justice to the
diversity and depth of this field within this article.1 However, what is noticeable, as Duf-
fin (2007) stresses, is that the question of tuning (and of Equal Temperament especially)
has not often broached the realms of musicology. Indeed, even within musicology the
problem of tuning is often seen as an interesting but difficult subset, a specialist area
which is not essential to an understanding of modern western music. For example, in
Westrup’s (1955) An Introduction to Musical History, tuning is not mentioned at all. Nor
does Blanning in his more recent (2008) The Triumph of Music deem it necessary to dis-
cuss the role of tuning. Having said this, the fact that Equal Temperament is premised on
a compromise is well known to theorists of tuning. Indeed, as will be seen, all tuning
systems involve some kind of a compromise. It is the manner of the compromise and the
basis of its justification that are at stake. The aim of this article is not to say something
new about Equal Temperament in musicological terms. Rather, I want to draw out some
of the implications of this topic for the history of knowledge and cultural theory.
To jump ahead to the main point that I want to draw out, I will suggest that so used are
we to the ‘Equal Temperament’ as a theoretical and practical device that we forget what
it was originally designed to do, namely, to overcome a specific musicological problem.
Worse, we are now unable to think or hear much of the music that surrounds us except in
these limited and limiting terms. A further strand of my argument is that there is no need
to make a strict division between what is natural with regard to tuning and what is social.
That is to say, this article also constitutes an attempt to think the natural and the social
together, using tuning as a case study (see Halewood, 2012 for another attempt to think
the natural and social together, in terms of Marx’s conception of the commodity). My
aim is not simply to decry ‘Equal Temperament’; it is to draw out and consider some
of the ramifications of this compromise and to describe how far removed it is from the
original conceptions of resonances in nature.2
Forgetting that western tuning is founded on a compromise is an indicator of the
inconsistency which lies at the heart of modernity. The tuning of western modern music
is another example of western modernity’s attempt to render its own abstractions as uni-
versal, as based on an unquestionable rationality and direct access to the truth of the
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world. This supposed universality, which gains its power from the standardization of tun-
ing, is then used to deem other approaches to tuning as exotic, simple, quaint, folkish,
backward, closer to nature. However, Equal Temperament is more than that. It is one
of the concrete modes of thought and action which has the appearance of universality.
It is not what it thinks or says it is. For, as will be seen, this seeming universality is also
based on a compromise. In this sense, Equal Temperament could be seen as an example
of what Whitehead (1932[1925]: 94) calls a ‘radical inconsistency at the basis of thought
[which] accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our civilization. It would
be going too far to say that it distracts thought. It enfeebles it, by reason of the inconsis-
tency lurking in the background.’ Whitehead is talking about what he calls the ‘Bifurca-
tion of Nature’ (Whitehead, 1964: 26–48; see also, Halewood, 2011: 1–22). Within this
model, hard science, especially physics, deals with the inert, external, natural world
while social and cultural analyses deal only with the values and meanings in which
humans find themselves immersed; or so it is supposed. This reinforces a division of aca-
demic labour, thought and activity which is inherent in western modernity and universi-
ties in particular; it creates and sustains the supposed division between the natural and
the social.
With regard to music, such an approach draws a strict line between the physics of
music and human perceptions thereof. It maintains a sharp dividing line between the
mathematical-physical elements of music, such as resonance and frequency, and social
analyses of music, which deal with cultural and historical factors that alter over time and
from place to place. Such an approach is evident in the work of psychologists such as
Levitin (2006) who separate the brain’s (or mind’s) reaction to music from the sound
phenomena themselves. For example: ‘Music, then, can be thought of as a type of per-
ceptual illusion in which our brain imposes structure and order on a sequence of sounds’
(Levitin, 2006: 109). This reduces the human (and hence, social) aspects of music, liter-
ature, or art to some kind of illusion, an interesting but culturally arbitrary epiphenome-
non. This is akin to one strand within the sociology of music that has emphasized the
extent to which music must be analysed within the framework of the social construction
of reality, as it is the meanings and definitions that humans apply to music which are of
interest. For example, Martin (1995) insists that music is solely a social activity which is
to be distinguished from the music itself which lies behind such activity:
It should be clear that the process by which collective definitions are established – the social
construction of reality – is in principle independent of the intrinsic properties of the activ-
ities and objects being defined. Mahler’s scores have presumably remained basically
unchanged since his death, for example, but public perception of them has been trans-
formed. (Martin, 1995: 31)
Whitehead comments witheringly on such conceptual positions:
The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and should
turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a
dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly,
meaninglessly. (Whitehead, 1932[1925]: 68–9)
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The task that Whitehead sets himself throughout his work is to avoid this Bifurcation of
Nature. In the case of music, the bifurcation is between the musical scores, notes, sound
waves, resonances, performances, and the human perceptions, reactions and feelings of
and towards these. Throughout this article, I will also attempt to avoid such a division,
not by reconciling the social and natural aspects of music but by taking both together,
thereby refusing any conceptual split. As Prior puts it, ‘we need to move away from a
sociology of music . . . toward a sociology with music’ (Prior, 2011: 132). In some
respects, my starting point is close to Latour’s (1993) position as outlined in the title
of his book We Have Never Been Modern. Where I differ from Latour is that I am pre-
pared to allow for, indeed to insist upon, some of the wider political implications of such
statements, especially with regard to questions of post-colonialism.
While I stated previously that models of tuning are not central to social analyses of
music, this does not mean that they have not been addressed at all. For example, Black-
stone (2011) attempts to distinguish the original Pythagorean model of tuning from the
manner in which music has been commodified under capitalism. More importantly, the
development of western music, and the role of tuning within this, is comprehensively
discussed by Max Weber in his text The Rational and Social Foundations of Music
(Weber, 1958[1921]). Here, and in a similar vein to the argumentation of The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 2003[1904–5]), Weber attempts to set out the
specific development of western music along with how and why such a development
took a different path from the forms of music of other cultures, such as those to be found
in China or Java. It is rationalization that is the key factor. Weber’s argument displays his
usual erudition and a detailed knowledge of harmonic theory. Yet, although he does
spend some time discussing the role of Equal Temperament (Weber, 1958[1921]: 89–
103), recognizing that it involves an ‘arbitrary equalization of tones’ (ibid.: 93), he views
such a ‘rational’ tuning system as secondary to the development of a rationalized harmo-
nic system. Moreover, Weber makes no mention of the natural in his text; the closest that
he comes being on the first page where he refers to the problem posed by such resonances
for tuning musical instruments3 as, simply, an ‘unalterable state of affairs’ (ibid.: 3). In
this way, Weber replicates the approaches of much of the sociology of music, as dis-
cussed above, in that it takes the social (human) element as primary and avoids the status
of the actual, natural, frequencies of musical notes. So, while Weber’s exposition does
point to the relevance of tuning for social analysis, he also points to an ongoing problem
in certain approaches to this field, namely the avoidance of the role of the natural. This is
a situation which I hope to partially redress throughout this article. The first step that I
will take is a brief exposition of Latour’s conception of modernity and compromise. This
is followed by an outline of three of Stengers’ (2010) key ideas as set out in Cosmopo-
litics, vol. I, namely, ‘factish’ and the two associated terms of ‘requirements’ and
‘obligations’.
A compromise at the heart of modernity
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour (1993) carefully and subtly sets out his position
that what he terms the ‘Modern Constitution’ is premised on a supposed division
between Nature and Society (with a bracketing of God). This constitution employs the
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practice of purification (and critique) both to establish and guarantee its premises. Sci-
entific practice represents objects and its procedures entail a purification to ensure that it
is nature alone which is its source and goal. Political and social analyses ignore nature
and premise a realm of subjects; they purify their analyses to develop accounts which
deal only with the machinations of humans, considered as societal or cultural entities
(ibid.: 29–32). That which is ruled out is the ‘old-fashioned’, mystical, messy, impure
mixing of nature and culture which Latour describes as ‘hybrids’ (ibid.: 10 and passim).
‘If we consider hybrids, we are dealing only with mixtures of nature and culture; if we
consider the work of purification, we confront a total separation between nature and cul-
ture’ (ibid.: 30).
With regard to musical tuning, all this leads to a series of questions. Is Equal Tem-
perament natural? Is Equal Temperament social? Or is Equal Temperament a hybrid?
We moderns are not naı¨ve enough to believe that our music with its tuning system is
natural in that it represents some kind of pure manifestation of nature. So, we might ask –
Is Equal Temperament ‘social’? – Is it a social construction, a mere cultural fiction,
simply ‘made up’ by a small ethnic group at a specific point in history, and therefore
no better or worse than any other musical system (‘world music’)? This approach would
also seem somewhat naı¨ve, not only in the light of Latour’s work but in respect to other
theorists of music who insist that the materiality of music, its objects, things, sounds, also
need to be addressed (see, for example: Born, 2005, 2012; Hennion, 2012). So, is Equal
Temperament a hybrid? While I would not want to provide a resounding ‘no’ to this
question, I do believe that we should treat it with caution. For Stengers, the insistence
on asking whether Equal Temperament is either natural or social, is part of the problem
(see, for example: Stengers, 2011: 172, 324–5, 331–2; Stengers, 2008; Stengers, 2009;
Pignarre and Stengers, 2011; 23–30). It is what we must resist. And, by simply stating
that Equal Temperament is a hybrid, we may have answered the question too easily, not
resisted enough, and not really gone beyond the bifurcation of the natural and the social
aspects of this problem.
The argument that I want to make is that Equal Temperament is neither simply social
or natural, but nor is it a hybrid. It came to be at a certain point in time. In this sense it has
a history. But its coming-to-be proceeded from, and continues to rely upon, the natural
resonance of things, as well as the technical development of devices able to measure fre-
quencies and resonance accurately, and the humanly social endeavours which run
throughout these; to systematize music (perhaps for the glory of God), to produce beauty,
to solve a problem, to make money. What is produced in and through these is a powerful
construction which, once it appears, seems to have always been possible, if not always to
have been there. It then becomes a powerful, standardized abstraction with which to cele-
brate and denigrate whole swaths of other music and musical ‘others’. To make this argu-
ment, I believe that Stengers’ work provides the best path forward.
Factishes, requirements and obligations
One reason that Stengers (2010: 18–27) introduces the notion of ‘factishes’ is to get over
the widespread but somewhat simple-minded notion that science deals with facts and
that any form of construction or fabrication in terms of experimental, social, or aesthetic
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practice somehow undermines or misrepresents the facticity of fact.4 Human involve-
ment always tends towards artifice, or so it is maintained. And, it is supposed, artifice
is artificial and not a true expression of nature, which is neither artificial nor fabricated,
by definition. In this respect, Stengers agrees with Latour; indeed Stengers is clear that
the term ‘factish’ is one that she shares with Latour (ibid.: 19).
One difference in emphasis between these two thinkers is that, for Stengers (2010), it
is important to reclaim construction and fabrication as inherent both to nature and to
experimental, scientific, endeavour. Stengers is much more of a philosopher of science
than Latour is (or would probably want to be). Stengers’ aim is to enable us to view the
operations of physics, for example, as able to generate new ‘factishes’ which are really
real but were not simply there in reality, waiting, patiently, to be discovered by brilliant
individual humans who then simply report on their new discoveries to an accepting, pas-
sive, quiescent audience. As Stengers puts it: ‘the beings fabricated by physics may
nonetheless be referred to as ‘‘real’’, endowed, no matter that they are ‘‘fabricated’’, with
an autonomous existence’ (ibid.: 19). The role of physics in the standardization of Equal
Temperament and the link between this and an apparent universality will be taken up at a
later stage.
For Stengers, that which prevents any charge that this emphasis on fabrication neces-
sarily entails a form of relativism, and also enables her to differentiate successful scien-
tific experiments from mere dabbling or the delusional claim that an unlimited number of
factishes can be created at will, by anybody, are the twin notions of ‘requirements’ and
‘obligations’. This again signals a different approach to that of Latour and will ultimately
provide a way of thinking about Equal Temperament which does not view it as some
kind of hybrid.
Although Stengers does not offer a definition of ‘requirements’, as such, she does
state that ‘requirements are entirely directed at phenomena, whereas obligations are
entirely relative to colleagues and controversy’ (Stengers, 2010: 51). Requirements are
to do with that aspect of the world with which the investigator is concerned. But this is
not a passive world, and it is not Nature, considered as a whole, unique realm. Require-
ments are addressed to that aspect or those elements of the world which are of interest,
and which, following Deleuze, Stengers describes as constituting a ‘problem’ (ibid.: 58–
61). This notion of problem signals the specificity of requirements. There are not (scien-
tific or experimental) requirements in general: rather, there is that which is required of
this specific phenomenon.
Obligations, on the other hand, refer to the more ‘human’ side of a practice. But to refer
to the human is not to invoke some blessed or gifted individual, nor is it to suggest that any
interpretation of the phenomenon or problem can be generated. As Stengers puts it:
. . . facts have value only if they can be recognized as being able to obligate practitioners to
agree about their interpretation. And the practitioner who represents this fact, and claims to
speak in its name, can do so only if she has first satisfied the strict obligations that will deter-
mine the value of what she proposes. (Stengers, 2010: 50)
That which obliges the practitioner is not an abstract set of rational or moral rules. The
practitioner, precisely insofar as she or he wishes to report upon the ‘findings’, is obliged
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by the very requirements that have been established and isolated. What is involved is the
process of ‘transforming a phenomenon into an ‘‘experimental fact’’, a reliable witness,
capable of making a difference among those who interpret it’ (Stengers, 2010: 50). Suc-
cessful scientific practice does not involve either human discovery of an inert world or
human interpretation of an inherently unknowable world. There is a ‘reciprocal capture’
(ibid.: 35–41) where a ‘dual process of identity construction is produced . . . identities
that coinvent one another’ (ibid.: 36). The researcher is invented and obliged by the prob-
lem while the researcher requires the problem to express itself as a factish. I will return to
the relation of requirements and obligations to the problem of tuning after making a short
detour through a brief conceptual history.
A very brief history of tuning
All things resonate. Chairs, tables, windows, flowers, amoebae, bones, trains, computers
all resonate at a certain frequency. Such resonance may suffuse nature but this does not
make it musical (Johnston, 1989: 30). Music, though I am shy of giving a definition,
would seem to involve the ordering of resonances; as opposed to random or disordered
resonances which only make noise. The question then becomes, which resonances
should we choose to order? This is an element of the requirement that we make of the
world – that it exhibit resonances which are constant and replicable. But how many such
resonances are we to allow? If one imagines a single violin string, it would seem that
there is a vast range of possible notes that can be played on this; that is why learners
of the violin often sound ‘out of tune’. They are not consistently playing the same note
or, more importantly, notes which are clearly related to each other.
This importance of the relation of notes was one which was addressed in detail by
Pythagoras. It was he, it is claimed, who first noticed that there is a relationship between
the length of a piece of metal (or animal gut) and the frequency at which it resonates –
what we might call its ‘pitch’ (Duffin, 2007: 24; Johnston, 1989: 5–7). Put simply, if you
take a piece of metal (or gut) of a certain length and hit it, it resonates at a specific fre-
quency. If you halve the length (apply a ratio of 1:2) then you get a strongly related fre-
quency which replicates the original frequency at a higher level (or pitch). In modern
parlance we would say that you get the same note, only an octave above. But what is
more interesting, and upon which Pythagoras bases his theory, is that if you shorten your
original piece of material by a third, then you create a different but strongly related fre-
quency. This is what we would now call a fifth above the original note. The relation of
two-thirds to the original length is important. The ratio which it expresses of 2:3, is even
more so (Duffin, 2007: 21–30; Johnston, 1989: 7–10).
This raises the question as to whether such a ratio or relation is arbitrary, one which
human ears are ‘tuned’ to hear, one which is culturally specific and alterable, as some,
such as Levitin (2006), suggest: ‘Sound waves – molecules of air vibrating at various
frequencies – do not themselves have pitch . . . it takes a human (or animal) brain to map
them . . . We perceive color [sic] in a similar way . . . Newton was the first to point out
that light is colourless’ (Levitin, 2006: 22). As stated earlier, this strict division between
a featureless, natural, world and the cultural realm of human perception of this external
world, in which humans grant the colour, sounds and music to the meaningless, external
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world, is what Whitehead refers to as the ‘Bifurcation of Nature’ It is exactly the kind of
division which I am attempting to avoid here.
To return to the initial problem of how to generate a set of ordered pitches, Pythagoras
initially felt that the best way to do this was by deploying the ratio of 2:3. This ratio of 2:3
replicates and enhances specific frequencies which were already there in the first note;
frequencies which complement and enhance each other, reinforce each other, bring out
the qualities that are present in the original. This is why this ratio is often called, in musi-
cal terms, the ‘dominant’ (Duffin, 2007: 20–3). Practically speaking, this is accom-
plished by repeatedly reducing a piece of metal by a third. This may seem peculiar
nowadays when the piano keyboard is regarded as the starting point (and end point)
of deciding what notes there are in a scale. We tend to imagine that you start with one
note and then move up a little bit to get the next, then up a bit more, then up a bit more,
moving by semitones (or halftones). But this does not actually generate notes – it is sim-
ply a way of ordering notes which have been generated by other means.
As Duffin (2007: 23–7) and Johnston (1989: 7–10) state, the accurate generation of
notes in the West has historically followed Pythagoras’ procedure and used the ratios
of resonances produced by a piece of metal as its foundation. One frequency is taken
as a starting point and given a name – ‘C’, for example. The 2:3 ratio is then applied and
another note, a fifth above C, is generated (which is then called G). This procedure is
then repeated and, using the commonly agreed notation of western music, the following
notes are generated:
1. C-G-D-A-E-B-F#-C#-G#-D#-A#-E#(F)-C.
This all seems straightforward, and 12 notes have apparently been generated which
correspond to the 12 notes which make up the modern octave5 on a keyboard. But there
is a major problem, one that Pythagoras noticed and which is, indeed, named after him;
this is the problem of the Pythagorean Comma (Duffin, 2007: 25–7). For the second C
generated out of this cycle of fifths, through this repeated application of the ratio of 2:3,
does not generate a frequency which has sympathetic overtones with that of the original
C. In fact, if these two ‘Cs’ are played together, they are extraordinarily dissonant, they
are genuinely out of tune. But this is not simply because humans hear it so. It is the extra-
polation via the process of applying the ratio of 2:3 which means that nature is, at this
point, ‘out of tune’ in comparison with a C which is generated through the repeated divi-
sion of a length of metal using the ratio of 1:2.
This problem can be expressed in mathematical terms (the following analysis is
adapted from Duffin, 2007; Jorgensen, 1991). Halving the length of a piece of metal,
applying a ratio of 1:2, produces a sympathetic frequency, indeed the same note, one
octave above. But it does not produce a new ‘note’. To adopt the modern formulation,
such frequencies are measured in Hertz (Hz) which increase when the length of metal
is shortened. Eight different ‘Cs’ can be generated simply by doubling the frequency.
Hence:
1. C ¼ 100 Hz
2. C1 ¼ 200 Hz
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3. C2 ¼ 400 Hz
4. C3 ¼ 800 Hz
5. C4 ¼ 1600 Hz
6. C5 ¼ 3200 Hz
7. C6 ¼ 6400 Hz
8. C7 ¼ 12800 Hz
But if the aim is to create ‘new’ notes which can be ordered and put in a scale (this is
the initial problem), then we need to use the cycle of fifths, which draws out the domi-
nant overtones and thus generates new notes. As Pythagoras noted, this involves a ratio
of 2:3. So, each frequency is multiplied by 1.5. So from the original C at 100 Hz, a G of
150 Hz is generated. Hence:
1. C ¼ 100 Hz
2. G ¼ 150 Hz
3. D ¼ 225 Hz
4. A ¼ 337.5 Hz
5. E ¼ 506.25 Hz
6. B ¼ 759.375 Hz
7. F# ¼ 1139.0625 Hz
8. C# ¼ 1708.5937 Hz
9. G# ¼ 2662.8905 Hz
10. D# ¼ 3844.3357 Hz
11. A# ¼ 5766.5035 Hz
12. E#(F) ¼ 8649.7552 Hz
13. C7 ¼ 12974.632 Hz
As becomes clear, the stark out-of-tuneness comes from the difference between:
1. C7 calculated at 12800 Hz (through the application of the 1:2 ratio) and C7 cal-
culated at 12974.632 Hz (calculated through the application of the 2:3 ratio, in
order to generate new notes). This produces a difference of 174.632 Hz between
the two different Cs and it is this which means that the second C is out of tune
(Duffin, 2007: 25).
Pythagoras was aware of this problem, and that is why it is named the Pythagorean
Comma. However, it did not trouble him too much. For Pythagoras and his followers,
the generation of such a wide range of notes (from C to C7) was not practical, and this
was simply a theoretical problem. The world, for Pythagoras, had done what was
required (in Stengers’, 2010, sense of the term); it had demonstrated itself in terms of
the ratios of resonances. We might say that a factish had been created – a scale of dif-
ferent tones. Pythagoras was obliged to speak of this scale but also to speak of the prob-
lem, of the comma, generated by the circle of fifths. His ‘solution’ to this problem was
simply to state that there was only a limited number of notes which could be safely gen-
erated (Johnston, 1989: 14). Hence he went on to expound the ratios which make up only
the notes A, B, C, D, E, F and G. The point to be stressed is that Pythagoras was clear and
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open about the compromise, why it was required and how it was constituted. Neverthe-
less, we might still be tempted to ask – is this scale natural or social? In one sense it
appears natural, in that the resonances occur in nature. In another sense, it seems social
as the out-of-tuneness, and the avoidance of this, seem to involve human perception and
action. However, dividing the natural from the social in this instance is not helpful. For
the out-of-tuneness is also real (natural) in that there is a clash between the initial reso-
nance (C1) and the final one (C7), as generated through the cycle of fifths.
To put it another way, the great advance that Pythagoras made was to recognize that
resonance, pitch and tuning were not a simple matter of identifying a given frequency but
of establishing relationships within which these frequencies were concordant or sympa-
thetic. As Whitehead puts it (though not discussing tuning, as such): ‘The practical coun-
sel to be derived from Pythagoras, is to measure, and thus to express quality in terms of
numerically determined quantity’ (Whitehead, 1932[1925]: 37). This linking of quantity
and quality is crucial as it suggests that there is no split between the natural and the
social, as nature always manifests itself in a certain kind of way. Quality is inherent
to all existence and not simply designated or produced by (social) humans. Describing
the different modes in which quality and quantity intertwine is indicative of a way of
thinking the natural and social together. Tuning and especially Equal Temperament are
important for this, for within it, quantity and quality, number and tone are irreducibly
interlinked.
As stated previously, this history and theory of tuning is a vast and complex area and
it is not possible to do justice to it here. I will give only one example of a different solu-
tion of how to distribute Pythagoras’ comma, namely that of ‘Meantone Intonation’
which was developed in the early 1500s (Barbour, 1951: 26). This was a system which
did not generate notes from a cycle of fifths but prioritized the intervals based on thirds
(C-E, for example) with the ratio of 4:5, rather than 2:3 (Duffin, 2007: 34). However, this
system still faced the problem of the Pythagorean Comma, namely that notes generated
from such ratio or intervals (be they a cycle of fifths or a cycle of thirds) do not fit into a
12-note scheme.6 The Meantone system emphasizes the importance of getting the inter-
vals of thirds and sixths in tune and is less worried about fifths. Yet it still comes up
against a similar problem to that of Pythagorean tuning, in that three such thirds do not
add up to an octave. Again, what was required was to distribute the Pythagorean Comma
between these ratios so that it did not disrupt the whole system. There were various ways
of doing this.
One solution which may seem remarkable nowadays was to have semitones (or half-
tones) of different ratios. The difference (interval) between a B flat and a B would there-
fore be of a different magnitude to that between an F and an F#. Thus there is a real
difference (not just a notational one) between a B flat and an A#. Therefore it is possible
to have a keyboard with many more keys (and notes) within the octave, such as that
designed by the Dutch physicist Fokker (1887–1972) which has 31 ‘notes’ in an octave
(Goodall, 2001: 106) or the keyboard suggested by the German physicist Helmholtz
(1821–94) with 24 keys to the octave (Weber, 1958[1921]: 123). Consequently, the mod-
ern 12-note keyboard, which was in development since at least the 13th century, might
have appeared to have all of its notes available all the time but it did not do so in practice
(Duffin, 2007: 48–51). The problem is that whatever key one starts in defines the ratios
10 History of the Human Sciences
of other notes in that scale; this means that certain notes become unplayable (Goodall,
2001: 118–20). Furthermore, this system generates what is known as a ‘wolf tone’
(Weber, 1958[1921]: 99; Goodall, 2001: 117; Duffin, 2007: 35), which is an extremely
out-of-tune interval between A# and E flat, with which, it is reported, Bach used to taunt
his organ tuner. This problem was well-known. Not playing such an interval became part
of the compromise necessary for the Meantone System to operate. As with Pythagorean
tuning, this compromise and the reason for it were clear and recognized. Yet, the out-
come of this compromise was not acceptable to all and the search was still on for a more
adequate system of tuning. Today, the most important of these is that of Equal
Temperament.
Equal temperament
As the name suggests, the key aspect of Equal Temperament is equality. The problem of
the different (or unequal) ratios between notes which dogged earlier tuning systems is
‘solved’ by asserting that the intervals between each note in a scale should be equal. This
may seem like common sense nowadays but it represented a musical revolution. Inter-
estingly, it was a contemporary of Galileo who first came up with the mathematical for-
mulation of Equal Temperament. In the late 1500s, Simon Stevin worked out that for the
12 notes on a modern chromatic keyboard to all be usable all of the time, each semitone
should be 1.059463094 times the frequency of the previous one (Goodall, 2001: 122).
However, this seemingly innocent mathematical formula had to wait a couple of centu-
ries until it was put into practice.
The eventual development of piano keyboards in which each note bears the same
mathematical ratio to all the others meant that the difficulties associated with earlier sys-
tems were overcome. This is reflected in the development of new composing techniques,
with great washes of colour and peculiar key changes as evidenced in the work of
Wagner, Mahler, Ravel and Debussy. No longer were melodies or keys fixed by their
starting point. They could go anywhere, end anywhere, and mix themselves freely,
knowing that they were always in tune and did not risk discord. (Paradoxically the seem-
ing discord that many find in 20th-century western music – Schoenberg, Messiaen, Berio,
Stockhausen – is only made possible by the assumption of the initial lack of discord in
tuning provided by Equal Temperament.)
When Equal Temperament did come into effect, it had one remarkable consequence: to
make the point starkly, within Equal Temperament, everything is out of tune. At least, this
is the case if the initial discovery of Pythagoras is taken into account, namely that there is a
precise relation between notes generated via sympathetic resonances and frequencies.
Equal Temperament is a severe compromise which moves tuning away from the principles
which had held sway for well over a millennium. Nevertheless, it is a very efficient com-
promise, and in many ways it is a very successful one. But, to return to the concepts of
Stengers, as discussed earlier, it involves a move away from (a betrayal of) the status of
the initial problem (the ordering of the relations of frequencies) and does not conform
to the initial obligations which these impose on those involved in this problem. Instead,
it shifts the problem, the requirements and the associated obligations without acknowled-
ging that it does so. Unlike Pythagorean tuning, this is a dishonest compromise.
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To reiterate: the Pythagorean system utilized the natural ratios inherent in the reso-
nances produced by striking metal. However, when extrapolated through the application
of the 2:3 ratio, these resonances did not return to their original point but produced new,
unsympathetic, frequencies. In attempting to solve this problem and to fix a set of notes
which produced a scale of notes that enabled musicians to play any note within that scale
without accentuating such a lack of sympathy, the system of Equal Temperament
renounces the initial stance that tuning is produced naturally. Instead, a new, rationalized
system is imposed which severs any such link. Now there is simply an equal gap between
each note. But the renunciation of the natural resonance between notes does not make
Equal Temperament inherently social. It cannot be said to be a mere construction of
human thoughts or actions. Instead, it is a curious kind of entity; mathematical yet his-
torical; absolute yet contingent; a rational yet imperfect compromise. It is not a hybrid; it
is not a combining of the natural and the social (or cultural). It is both at once, more of an
accretion than an addition.
This is analogous to a similar manoeuvre which Stengers (2010: 112–28) identifies
in chapter 9 of Cosmopolitics, vol. I, ‘The Lagrangian Event’, in which she outlines
how the 18th-century mathematician Joseph Louis Lagrange developed a mathematical
formalization of the experiments and conclusions of Galileo on the character of falling
bodies. Galileo had produced an account which enabled an equilibrium to be posited,
so that falling bodies could be measured ‘at an instant’, but he did so by always relating
this equilibrium to its relation to (accelerating) bodies, thereby staying faithful to the
experimental requirements and obligations which had originally been outlined.
Lagrange, on the other hand, generalizes Galileo’s account so that, as Stengers puts
it, ‘the effect of forces can be defined independently of whether the bodies on which
they act are in a state of rest or in motion’ (Stengers, 2010: 117). But such a general-
ization is achieved by a ‘mathematical sleight of hand’ (ibid.: 119) which entails that
Lagrange’s theory is premised on a ‘fiction’ (ibid.: 118 ff.). This is not to say that Sten-
gers condemns Lagrange’s work. She celebrates the ingenuity and power of this
abstraction but insists that it is necessary to recognize it as an abstraction and not a
description of reality as it really is (ibid.: 126–8). It is, as with all abstractions, both
creative and dangerous.
Lagrange abstracts from the specificity of the problem identified by Galileo and
attempts to describe the relation of any force to any body. But Lagrange’s abstraction
involves an assumption:
What this means – and it is here that the power of the Lagrangian fiction comes into its own –
is that the description of the instantaneous state can be construed as if it referred to a state of
static equilibrium like that of the Galilean weight-counterweight situation. ‘As if’ is the key-
word of the Langrangian event. (Stengers, 2010: 119)
This ‘as if’ is hidden behind the supposed all-conquering authority of the mathematical
sign for equality (‘‘¼’’), which appears to outline an equality in reality. ‘This power
comes from the mathematical sleight of hand the ¼ sign authorizes’ (Stengers, 2010:
119). Yet this equality is only an abstract equality which proceeds from and relies upon
no fixed thing in actuality; it is not an equality ‘in reality’.
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This ‘as if’, this ‘sleight of hand’, this attempt to insert equality into reality, when it is
not really there, through the recourse to the unwarranted authority of abstract and uni-
versal mathematicization, is, I would suggest, exactly what happened and still happens,
in the case of Equal Temperament. The correct interval is (¼) 1.059463094. To put it
another way, the equals signs helps mask the specific compromise which is at the
heart of Equal Temperament. As has been seen, all tuning systems involve some
compromise but that of Equal Temperament is based on a rejection of the ratios
of natural resonance as its starting point. Instead, it forces an equality into nature
which is not there but still claims another kind of naturalness, that which is pre-
mised in, and justified by, the rational, mathematical precision of equal steps
between notes. As will be seen in the following and final section, the role of this
equality in Equal Temperament is a dangerous one.
Compromise, standardization and the appearance of
universality
There was no one event in which Equal Temperament came to be generally accepted in
western music; it was a long and tortuous process. Importantly, this is a process which
did not involve only those involved in music. While there might have been some agree-
ment among musicians and musicologists on the need for a standard method of tuning,
there was a lack of a system for providing this. It is here that physics made its contribu-
tion, perhaps most clearly in the work of Hermann van Helmholtz (1954[1885]).
Through his development of a device (now known as the Helmholtz resonator), Helm-
holtz was able to establish, experimentally, the fundamental resonating frequency of
various membranes. He claimed to be able to identify and replicate exact frequencies.
These could then be standardized and put into an accurate scale. By providing a fixed
scheme of natural resonances which could then be ordered into a scale, physics helped
justify and promulgate Equal Temperament as a supposedly universal, rational yet nat-
ural system. The question of resonance and the definition of Equal Temperament were
taken out of the hands of musicians; the scope was widened and an inextricable link
was made between music, tuning, resonance and physics.
One important aspect of this was the fixing of a standard pitch from which all other
notes would be tuned. This is what is now termed ‘concert pitch’. Previously, it was pos-
sible, and likely, for individual tuners to decide what resonance would be the starting
point from which all other notes would be derived. For example, the organ in one town
or city could be tuned to one starting frequency, while that in another town or city could
have a different one. The point being that any frequency could be used. This is similar to
the question of ‘local time’. Up until the 19th century, clocks in different towns and cities
were set according to local observations of the sun’s path and zenith. This meant that the
time in Bristol was 10 minutes ‘behind’ London. With the introduction of the telegraph,
and national railways (and timetables), it became necessary to standardize time in the
UK, basing it on Greenwich Mean Time. This was effected in the 1840s (Karsten,
2013: 152–4). The UK thereby established a theoretical and practical universal time for
itself and the world as all time zones were, and still are, defined in relation to their long-
itudinal relation to the observatory in Greenwich Park in London. Again, this involves a
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forcing of equality onto reality in the name of mathematics, so that the same time always
holds throughout the UK.
In a similar way, and following the link between electrical resonance and frequency
established in the 19th century by scientists such as Hertz and Helmholtz, the French gov-
ernment decreed, in 1859, the A above middle C to be 435 Hz (Haynes, 2002: 346–8). In
1896 the British adopted 439 Hz (ibid.: 355–8). In the 20th century A was deemed to be
440 Hz and this was adopted by the International Organization for Standardization in
1939 (ibid.: 361; Johnston, 1989: 38). The linking of questions of resonance and tuning
to those of physics marks an important stage. No longer is it a ‘local’, though important,
problem which is played out in the realm of music and musicians. It is now tied to ques-
tions of standardization and physics. In terms of concert pitch A is 440 Hz: A ¼ 440 Hz
and we should remind ourselves of the subtle role that this sign of equality plays, after
Lagrange. And, as Stengers argues throughout the first volume of Cosmopolitics (2010),
in the 20th century it was physics, most especially theoretical physics, which claimed
that it alone had the authority to make accurate and adequate statements about reality,
about nature, as only physics was ‘capable of unravelling the enigma of reality’ (Sten-
gers, 2010: 234). Stengers’ aim is to retrace and reinvigorate the path and the questions
which led to this state of affairs. In doing so, she makes the crucial point that any claim to
being able to explain all, involves a very specific understanding of universality (ibid.:
180–2). The ‘all’ which physics claims for itself needed to be constructed. The same
applies to the ‘equals’ which is the template of Equal Temperament.
The power of Equal Temperament comes precisely from its misrecognition of its
constructedness. Unlike earlier tuning systems which recognized themselves as com-
promises, as approximations designed to work with and against nature (to avoid the
Pythagorean Comma or the wolf tone, for example), Equal Temperament denies its
own constructedness and claims itself to be universal. It can be used by anyone, any-
where, as long as he or she has access to a device that will give him or her an A at
440 Hz (a simple tuning-fork will do). The simplicity and crucially the portability of
Equal Temperament appear to make it available to all. Through its standardization it
claims universality. But in doing so, it masks its particularity and the very specific com-
promise upon which it is premised. It hides behind the equals sign inherent in Equal Tem-
perament. Like the whole of modernity (if such a thing can be said to exist), there is a
compromise at its very heart which it papers over and claims does not exist.
Universality, it turns out, is not universal. This is a point which needs to be empha-
sized. The so-called and self-claimed universalism which appears to be an inherent trait
of the Enlightenment conception of the (male) human subject, as pointed out by many
feminists, post-colonial theorists and post-structuralists, does not simply take one form.
It is not in itself universal. This is why it needs to be countered in its individual mani-
festations. I would suggest that one neglected aspect of such universalism is precisely
that of Equal Temperament which has become the ubiquitous background to the music
of the West. The compromise and banality that are at its heart are supported by its stan-
dardization. To paraphrase Adorno and Horkheimer: ‘The whole world is made to pass
through the filter of Equal Temperament [‘‘the culture industry’’ in the original]’
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 126). Or, as Weber puts it: ‘The whole of modern chor-
dal harmonic music is unthinkable without temperament and its consequences’ (Weber,
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1958[1921]: 101). The problem is that the compromise which is at its heart is more
severe than the compromises which were involved in other systems of tuning. It is not
that Equal Temperament is either more, or less, natural or social than other forms of tun-
ing. It is that the character of its compromise is masked by the apparent objectivity
granted to it through its alliance with physics. It presents itself as a seemingly logical
solution which is apparently applicable anywhere and anywhen. It is both standard and
universal.
Because of its portability, standardized form and claims to universality, Equal Tem-
perament has driven out more local or different forms of tuning. This was initially a
problem for the non-standard tunings of folk music: throughout the 19th century, continu-
ing to today, Celtic music, Balkan music, Jewish music, ‘Gypsy’ music have been con-
fronted with the juggernaut of the abstract-concrete system of Equal Temperament
which has no truck with narrow thirds, quarter tones, etc. Indeed the accordion, an instru-
ment which was itself developed in the 19th century, was one of the main harbingers of
Equal Temperament into folk music. The accordion has a fixed tuning of its reeds, com-
pleted at source, to which all other instruments must tune. It is also very loud. It would
seem that the implacable and unalterable fact of the Equal Temperament tuning of the
accordion has driven out the various, non-standard tunings of much western folk music.
This colonization of the compromise of Equal Temperament goes beyond this. In its
rigid designation of equal distances between each semitone, it completely disallows the
possibility of any smaller gaps, such as that of the quarter tone, which is to be found, for
example, in the music of the ‘Middle East’, in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and so forth. This
is not to say that the quarter tone ever played a major part in western music, as it has,
perhaps, always been deemed to be different, exotic, even out of tune. But the adoption
of Equal Temperament as the only system of tuning founded on universal mathematical
principles has led those of us brought up in this culture to judge other tuning systems
even more harshly, in that they are not ‘rational’ or ‘universal’ in the same way that
Equal Temperament is supposed to be. Other forms of tuning, therefore, are relegated
to being merely cultural, evocative, or quaint. The spread of Equal Temperament key-
boards (such as the accordion or, more recently, the synthesizer or electronic keyboard)
has also had a huge influence around the world, for example, in the music for Bollywood
films which now use such devices extensively, thereby distorting the original tuning
which would have pervaded such music of the ‘Indian subcontinent’. This abstract-
concrete system of Equal Temperament certainly appears to be another element of Said’s
(2003) notion of orientalism.
This mention of Said is important and should help temper any suspicions that my
argument is, itself, universalist. For, despite the tenor of what has gone before, it is
important to state that Equal Temperament has not been successful in eradicating
all other forms of tuning. In terms of the standardization of concert pitch, UK orchestras
do tend to adhere to 440 Hz as is the case with most North American ones. However, some
prefer 442 Hz or 443 Hz, as do many European orchestras. The Berlin Philharmonic tunes
to 443 Hz, for example (see Haynes, 2002: 360, 369–80; Berliner-Philharmoniker, 2012).
String quartets will tune each instrument in relation to itself and the other three instru-
ments, and not by simply matching each individual string to the notes on a piano tuned
to Equal Temperament. Choirs, especially unaccompanied ones, are unlikely to sing notes
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which completely correspond to the notes of Equal Temperament, as this is surpris-
ingly difficult. Furthermore, Equal Temperament has not driven out or eradicated other
forms of tuning. Despite being confronted by the accordion or the synthesizer, Bolly-
wood music, and with it that of the Balkans, Jewish and ‘Gypsy’ music, have not sim-
ply bowed down. They have had to confront but not acquiesce to Equal Temperament.
There has been resistance, perhaps through accommodations. I do not have knowledge
or ability to detail these. However, I would suggest that the specific ways in which dif-
ferent systems of tuning meet and mingle could provide an interesting insight into the
incomplete but ongoing interrelations of a self-styled modernity with other ways of liv-
ing and doing.
In conclusion, the development of Equal Temperament, based as it is on a logical,
abstract compromise, is not, as Miller (1993) suggests, a mere metaphor or trope of the
development of modernity. Equal Temperament is one aspect of the development of
what we term modernity, though its character and import have not been recognized
to the extent that they should have been. Returning to the question of whether Equal
Temperament is natural or social, following Stengers, I would suggest that making
such a strict division is part of the problem and is what we must resist. If we do not
then we are in danger of seeing the mathematical formulation of Equal Temperament
(each interval ¼ 1.059463094) as no simple social construction. It appears to be a pur-
ified, objective (natural) description, produced through the authority of the certainty of
mathematics, to produce an elegant and universal system of tuning. Furthermore, this is
backed up by the later work of physics on resonance and frequency. We have the assur-
ance of Helmholtz and Hertz with the measurement system named after the latter to be
able to pronounce upon the accuracy of Equal Temperament. This is a more complex
notion of the natural than that which is associated with Pythagoras (or so it would
seem). Yet, at the same time, Equal Temperament is often viewed as the tuning system
which supports and expresses the uniqueness of western music, of a specific social-
cultural system. It is a crucial element of what founds western music and differentiates
it from other musical forms around the world. In this respect, it retains an important
degree of sociality.
Such approaches return us to Latour (1993) and his claim that ‘we have never been
modern’, for this jumping back and forth is indicative of the procedure of modernity:
The critical power of the moderns lies in this double language: they can mobilize Nature at
the heart of social relationships, even as they leave Nature infinitely remote from human
beings; they are free to make and unmake their society, even as they render its laws ineluct-
able, necessary and absolute. (Latour, 1993: 37)
I agree with Latour on this point but I do not think that stating that Equal Tempera-
ment is a hybrid does justice to the complexity and specificity of this peculiar,
abstract but concrete entity. Instead, as I have tried to argue throughout this article,
there is a need to refuse to immediately differentiate between what is natural and
what is social. What is required is a tracing of the path by which Equal Tempera-
ment came to be. Once this is accomplished, we can begin to assess the wider
impacts that it has had, for example, in its contemporary relation to other tuning
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systems and how this reflects and reinforces a whole host of enduring power rela-
tions. I do not want to state that Equal Temperament is just another example of the
Enlightenment project gone wrong; an example of the inherent imperialist character
of the modern West. It is both more and less than that.
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Notes
This article is based on a paper I gave at the annual conference of the Society for Literature, Sci-
ence and the Arts in Kitchener, Ontario, Canada, 22–5 September 2012. Isabelle Stengers was the
respondent to my panel and I am grateful to her for her encouragement, compliments and sugges-
tions which I have used to, hopefully, improve this piece. I am also grateful to the anonymous
reviewers who read this article prior to publication. Their comments and suggestions have helped
improve this piece greatly.
1. A detailed and comprehensive account can be found in Jorgensen’s (1991) Tuning: Containing
the Perfection of Eighteenth-century Temperament, the Lost Art of Nineteenth-century Tem-
perament, and the Science of Equal Temperament, Complete with Instructions for Aural and
Electronic Tuning. A more user-friendly text is Goodall’s (2001) Big Bangs: The Story of Five
Discoveries That Changed Musical History. For readers of German, a recent text which makes
some of the points I want to draw out in this article is Harrasser’s (2013) ‘Musicalische
Paradoxal-Discourse. Oder: Gute Temperaturen fu¨r glu¨ckliche Ohren’.
2. Throughout this article, I will resist the temptation to put the terms ‘nature’ or ‘natural’ in
inverted commas. For, as will be seen as the argument develops, I do not want to assert or dis-
miss either of these terms or their apparent counterparts, ‘social’ and ‘cultural’. Instead, one
main strand of my argument is to interrogate and reorient the manner and status of these terms
as they are used within modernity. This may make for uncomfortable reading at points. How-
ever, I feel this to be more satisfactory than the alternative which would pepper the text with
inverted commas and lessen the force of my argument.
3. This problem is known as the ‘Pythagorean Comma’ which I will discuss in more detail in the
body of this article.
4. It should be noted that the term ‘factish’ was developed by Isabelle Stengers in conjunction with
Tobie Nathan (and also Bruno Latour). One of their aims in developing this concept was to
counter the idea that fetishism was somehow restricted to ‘other’, non-western, cultures. This
critique of a ‘colonialist’ approach which denigrates unfamiliar practices can be linked to the
idea that Equal Temperament is a tuning system which is more rational and universal than
those found in other cultures or subcultures (see Nathan and Stengers [2012(1995)]) and
Latour (2010 – especially ch. one). I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this text who
pointed this out to me.
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5. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that ‘octave’ is the accepted term for this as it suggests that only 8
notes are involved. The reason for this is that those originally involved in generating notes
were only confident of being able to establish clean ratios for the notes C, D, E, F, G, A,
B, C1 (C1 refers to the note with twice the frequency of the original C). It will be noted that
these are represented by the ‘white’ keys on a piano. Only later were the more complex, chro-
matic notes able to be accurately generated, hence producing C#, D#, F#, G#, A# – the ‘black’
notes on a keyboard.
6. The move from C to E and from E to G#, which is based on an interval of a third (and a ratio) of
4:5, might suggest that the next note generated would be C1. However, this does not occur. As
with the cycle of fifths, there is a discrepancy between C and C1 generated by applying the ratio
of 1:2 once and applying that of 4:5 three times.
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